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IN THE EYE OF THE STORM:
A JUDGE'S EXPERIENCE IN
LETHAL-INJECTION LITIGATION
The Honorable Jeremy Fogel*
INTRODUCTION
The case of Morales v. Tilton,' which challenges the constitution-
ality of California's lethal-injection protocol for executions, is
unique among the many thousands of disputes over which I have
presided in more than twenty-six years as a federal and state judge.
It has demanded the most from me-intellectually, emotionally,
and spiritually-of any matter that ever has appeared on my
docket. While I may not comment on the merits of the case be-
cause it is still pending before me,2 I am hopeful that those who
read this Article will find my personal experience of interest, as a
commentary on the workings of our legal system, a meditation on
being a judge, and a reflection upon the potency of the death pen-
alty as an issue in our society.
This Article focuses on five aspects of my personal experience.
Part I reviews the history of my involvement with lethal-injection
litigation-beginning in 2004 with the case of Cooper v. Rimmer 3-
and how what I initially viewed as a far-fetched, entirely hypotheti-
cal argument about the potential risks of lethal injection came to
concern me enough that I enjoined an execution. Part II discusses
the cultural divide between the judiciary and the state bureaucracy
that is responsible for carrying out executions, and the ways in
which that divide has affected both the Morales case in particular
and California's efforts to address questions concerning its lethal-
injection protocol generally. Part III concerns the role and re-
* Judge, United States District Court, Northern District of California. I am very
grateful for the invaluable assistance of George 0. Kolombatovich, one of the Court's
three death-penalty staff attorneys, both with this Article and throughout the Morales
litigation.
1. 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal.) and prelim. inj. conditionally denied sub nom.
Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal.), affd, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.
2006).
2. Code of Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3(A)(6) (2000), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.htmi# 3 .
3. No. 5-4-cv-436-JF, 2004 WL 231325 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2004) (den. TRO &
prelim. inj.), affd, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004), dismissed sub nom. Cooper v. Wood-
ford, No. 5-4-cv-436-JF (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2004).
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sponse of the news media in Morales and other lethal-injection
cases. This Part also describes the anomalous experience of being
a central figure in a major news story while at the same time being
unable for ethical reasons to make any substantive comment about
it.4 Part IV discusses the reaction of the non-lawyer public to the
lethal-injection controversy, and how the deep differences within
public opinion about the death penalty overshadow and skew any
discussion of the issues that legal challenges to lethal injection ac-
tually present. Part V discusses the ways in which Morales has af-
fected my understanding of myself as a judge and as a person.
I. HISTORY
A. Cooper v. Rimmer 5
Kevin Cooper was a convicted multiple-murderer who for many
years had been pursuing habeas corpus proceedings based on a
claim of innocence. 6 His habeas case had attracted significant me-
dia attention and was the latest flashpoint in California's ongoing
debate about capital punishment.7 On February 2, 2004, eight days
before his scheduled execution date, Cooper filed a civil-rights
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that California's lethal-in-
jection protocol was unconstitutional because it created an undue
risk that the person being executed would experience excruciating
pain.8 Cooper sought a temporary restraining order to prevent his
execution. 9 Because all executions in California are carried out at
San Quentin State Prison, which is located in the Northern District
of California, Cooper filed the case in our court. I drew the case by
random assignment.
My immediate reaction to Cooper's claims was extremely skepti-
cal. Having been a judge for so long in a state in which capital
punishment has been so controversial that three justices of the
state supreme court were voted out of office because of their per-
4. As of this writing, Morales remains a pending case, and further proceedings
with respect to the state's most recent revisions to its lethal-injection protocol are
anticipated. Accordingly, this Article is based entirely upon past events. Any refer-
ence to my opinions as to legal or factual issues involves matters already in the public
record and is made solely to provide historical context for the Article. Nothing in the
Article is intended to suggest my view of the merits of any pending legal or factual
issue in Morales or any other case.
5. 2004 WL 231325.
6. Id. at *1.
7. Id. at *4.
8. Id. at *1.
9. Id.
[Vol. XXXV
EYE OF THE STORM
ceived bias against the death penalty, 10 I instinctively questioned
the timing and context of Cooper's suit. In more than a decade of
unending litigation since his conviction, Cooper had never chal-
lenged the constitutionality of California's method of execution.
Further, because a serious inquiry into the factual basis of his le-
thal-injection claims could not possibly be completed within eight
days, a decision even to conduct such an inquiry would require a
stay of execution. Virtually all of the public statements made on
Cooper's behalf focused on his claim of innocence, not the means
by which he would be executed.1 Even though Cooper's argument
concerning lethal injection was well articulated by capable counsel,
the factual premise of that argument-that a massive dose of so-
dium thiopental might be insufficient to ensure Cooper's uncon-
sciousness prior to the administration of two other (potentially
pain-causing) drugs-made little intuitive sense. 2 As I noted in
denying Cooper's request for a temporary restraining order,
[w]hile the stated objective of the present action is to address
alleged deficiencies in California's lethal injection protocol, the
timing of its filing reasonably suggests that an equally important
purpose of the action is to stay Plaintiff's execution so that
Plaintiff may continue to pursue claims going to the validity of
his conviction. 3
10. California holds retention elections for justices of its appellate courts in which
the justices' names appear periodically on the ballot for a "yes" or "no" vote. In 1986,
Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso re-
ceived a majority of "no" votes after death-penalty supporters mounted a statewide
campaign accusing the three of consistently refusing to affirm death sentences be-
cause of their personal opposition to capital punishment rather than on the merits of
the cases involved. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Law Is the Mere Continuation of Politics
by Different Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-first Century, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 423, 444 n.93 (2007) (citing various commentators who discuss the
campaign against these three justices, including JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (Univ. Cal. Press
1989); John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Account-
ability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81 (1986); Joseph R. Grodin, Judicial Elections:
The California Experience, 70 JUDICATURE 365 (1987); John T. Wold & John H. Cul-
ver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue
of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987)).
11. See Save Kevin Cooper, http://www.savekevincooper.org/background.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
12. The protocol calls for the injection of a sequence of three drugs into the per-
son being executed: sodium thiopental, a barbiturate sedative, to induce unconscious-
ness; pancuronium bromide, a neuromuscular blocking agent, to induce paralysis; and
potassium chloride, to induce cardiac arrest. The state subsequently stipulated that it
would be unconstitutional to inject a conscious person with the quantity of either
pancuronium bromide or potassium chloride specified by the protocol.
13. Cooper, 2004 WL 231325, at *2 n.1.
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Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed my ruling,14 Cooper was not
executed because the court accepted his successive habeas petition
and ordered further proceedings in the district court that had con-
sidered his federal habeas claims.15 While there was no legal im-
pediment to his doing so, Cooper chose not to pursue his lethal-
injection challenge, which eventually was dismissed without
prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 16
B. Beardslee v. Woodford 17
A year later, another death-row inmate, Donald Beardslee, filed
a nearly identical challenge to California's lethal-injection proto-
col.1 8 Because it raised substantially the same issues as Cooper,
Beardslee's case was assigned to me under our court's related-case
procedures.' 9 Unlike Cooper, Beardslee did not assert his inno-
cence of the underlying crime, and thus his lethal-injection chal-
lenge was his last realistic hope of avoiding execution. In addition,
Beardslee filed his challenge approximately a month before his
scheduled execution date, which permitted at least a preliminary
examination of the merits of his claims without the necessity of a
stay.2 °
Even under these circumstances, I had a very difficult time find-
ing substance in Beardslee's arguments. The pharmacological evi-
dence seemed overwhelming: there was virtually no risk that a
person receiving the quantity of sodium thiopental provided under
the execution protocol would be conscious when the two drugs
with the potential for inflicting pain were injected.2 1 While there
were ambiguous notations in several execution logs, it did not ap-
pear that any previous execution by lethal injection in California
had gone seriously awry. Beardslee's argument that the paralytic
14. Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004). Significantly, in light of the
subsequent debate as to the proper standard of review for lethal-injection challenges,
the court concluded that Cooper had failed to show "that he is subject to an unneces-
sary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering." Id. at 1033.
15. Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
16. Cooper v. Woodford, No. 5-4-cv-436-JF (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2004).
17. No. 5-4-cv-5381-JF, 2005 WL 40073 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2005) (den. TRO &
prelim. inj.), aff'd, 395 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2005).
18. Beardslee, 2005 WL 40073, at *2. Beardslee also claimed that the use of
pancuronium bromide to induce paralysis violates the First Amendment because it
prevents a person being executed from speaking in the event that the sodium thiopen-
tal fails to induce unconsciousness. See id. at *3; Beardslee, 395 F.3d at 1076.
19. N.D. CAL. Civ. L.R. 3-12.
20. Beardslee, 2005 WL 40073, at *2.
21. Id.
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effects of pancuronium bromide would have masked any failure to
induce unconsciousness struck me as creative but ultimately with-
out real substance; in the absence of an actual risk of inadequate
anesthesia, there could be nothing to mask. As I had in Cooper, I
denied relief, finding that Beardslee had failed to show a reasona-
ble likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.22 Following an
unsuccessful appeal to the Ninth Circuit 23 and petition for certio-
rari to the Supreme Court,24 Beardslee was executed, apparently
without incident.
C. Morales v. Tilton2 5
In April 2005, a British medical journal, The Lancet, published a
study of autopsy data from forty-nine lethal-injection executions.2 6
The study found that forty-three percent of the executed inmates
whose autopsy records were reviewed had concentrations of so-
dium thiopental in their blood that were consistent with awareness,
apparently lending at least some credence to the questions about
the three-drug combination that had been raised by Cooper and
Beardslee in California and by others in similar cases around the
country.27 The next two California executions raised additional
concerns, even though neither of the inmates involved asserted a
lethal-injection challenge. The first case involved Stanley "Tookie"
Williams, the founder of the "Crips" street gang, whose death sen-
tence and claims of both innocence and post-conviction rehabilita-
tion attracted international interest. 8 " The execution team
members responsible for inserting the catheters into Williams's
veins were unable to set one of the two catheters required by the
execution protocol and eventually gave up trying to do So. 2 9 Wil-
liams was executed, but the procedure took nearly twice as long as
22. Id. at *3-4.
23. Beardslee, 395 F.3d 1064.
24. Beardslee v. Woodford, 543 U.S. 1096 (2005).
25. 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal.) and prelim. inj. conditionally denied sub nom.
Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal.), affd, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.
2006).
26. Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Exe-
cution, 365 LANCET 1412 (2005).
27. The methodology of the study later was criticized even by critics of lethal in-
jection, and it was not relied upon by Morales's expert witnesses at subsequent
hearings.
28. See Tookie's Corner, http://www.tookie.com/nobel-newslinks.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2008).
29. Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
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expected.30 The second case involved Clarence Ray Allen, a septu-
agenarian inmate whose execution drew attention because of his
age and his extremely fragile medical condition, which included ad-
vanced heart disease.31 While the problems experienced in the
Williams execution were not repeated, it took twice the designated
dose of potassium chloride to make Allen's heart stop beating. 32
When asked why it was necessary to double a dosage that was in-
tended and sufficient to cause almost instantaneous death in the
healthiest of persons, San Quentin's warden suggested that "this
guy's heart has been beating for 76 years, and it took awhile for it
to stop."
3 3
It was against this background that Michael Morales, who had
been on death row for nearly twenty-five years for a particularly
heinous rape and murder, brought a new challenge to California's
lethal-injection protocol in January 2006.34 Once again, the case
was assigned to me under the court's related-case procedures.
Because he filed his case even before his execution date was for-
mally set by the state trial court, Morales was able to obtain expe-
dited fact discovery prior to a hearing on his motion for a
preliminary injunction. As I later noted, "the record in the present
action [thus was] substantially more developed than the record in
Cooper or Beardslee."36 For the first time, that record contained all
of the logs and other documentation for each of the eleven execu-
tions by lethal injection at San Quentin, including the recent execu-
tions of Williams and Allen.37
By early February 2006, I had reached the conclusion that an
independent factual inquiry into California's administration of its
lethal-injection protocol was warranted. In the two years since
Cooper, an issue that I had dismissed as a desperate, transparent
ploy to postpone an inevitable execution had begun to seem seri-
ous and substantial. The documented problems with the Williams
and Allen executions heightened my concerns. Given the virtual
certainty that the dosage of sodium thiopental prescribed by the
30. Kevin Fagan, The Execution of Stanley Tookie Williams: Eyewitness: Prisoner
Did Not Die Meekly, Quietly, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2005, at A12.
31. Kevin Fagan, Reporter's Eyewitness Account of Allen's Execution, S.F.




34. Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972.
35. N.D. CAL. Civ. L.R. 3-12.
36. Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
37. See id. at 1043-46; Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 975 n.3.
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protocol was sufficient to cause virtually everyone to stop breath-
ing within one minute, why did a majority of the execution logs
reflect the presence of "respirations" well after that minute had
passed? Why were the heart rates of several of the inmates ele-
vated rather than slowed after the injection of such a massive
amount of sedative? Why did Allen require a second injection of
potassium chloride when the first should have been sufficient to
kill a healthy horse, let alone a frail seventy-six-year-old man with
a long history of heart disease? With well over 600 inmates on
California's death row, did it not make sense to resolve these and
similar questions as definitively as possible in order to limit future
litigation?
I gave serious consideration to issuing a stay of execution and
setting an evidentiary hearing, but in the end I felt compelled to
find a way to permit the execution to proceed even in light of my
concerns. Morales had been awaiting execution for more than
twenty-five years, and even in comparison to those of other capital
defendants, his crimes were particularly repugnant.3a There was no
doubt about his guilt; in fact, he had admitted his actions, and his
arguments throughout his many years of appeals and habeas peti-
tions had focused almost entirely on the appropriateness of his sen-
tence.39 The victim had lived in a relatively small agricultural
community in California's Central Valley, and her family and loved
ones, as well as members of the community, were particularly vocal
in support of the execution. Thus, I decided to give the state a
choice: it could modify the execution protocol to reduce or elimi-
nate the possibility that Morales would be conscious during the ad-
ministration of pain-inducing drugs, or the execution would be
postponed pending discovery and an evidentiary hearing. If the
state chose to proceed, it either could execute Morales using only
sedatives (which would eliminate the risk of excessive pain en-
tirely),4 ° or it could designate a person or persons with training in
anesthesia to monitor Morales's level of consciousness during the
38. Morales murdered 17-year-old Terri Winchell at the request of his cousin, who
was involved in a love triangle with the victim and another man. He attempted to
strangle the victim with a belt, bludgeoned her with a hammer, raped her, and stabbed
her to death with a knife, then left her exposed body in a vineyard. See generally
Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2004).
39. Morales's cousin received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
40. Of the three drugs in the lethal-injection protocol, only the third-potassium
chloride-will cause excessive pain if the inmate is not unconscious. The second
drug-pancuronium bromide-does not cause significant pain in itself but rather
masks the pain caused by the potassium chloride by inducing paralysis.
2008]
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execution and take appropriate steps in the event Morales was not
unconscious when the second and third drugs were injected.4' In
either case, even if Morales was executed, I urged state officials to
conduct a "thorough review" of all aspects of its protocol going
forward.4" Two days later, the state chose the second option.,
designating two board-certified anesthesiologists to attend the
execution.43
Considering that physician involvement in executions itself has
become a controversial issue, it is significant that prior to this point
neither party had raised any concern about medical ethics.
Morales himself had argued that California's lethal-injection proto-
col was flawed in large part because the members of the execution
team lacked sufficient training to monitor condemned inmates'
level of consciousness, and that only a trained medical professional
could do S0. 44 While the anesthesiologists enlisted by the state re-
quested and were promised anonymity, neither of them expressed
any ethical concern at that time about what they understood to be
their role. As soon as I issued an order allowing the execution to
proceed, however, there was a loud, immediate reaction from the
organized medical community.
Ultimately, Morales was not executed.45 My order had provided
that in that event, an evidentiary hearing on the lethal-injection
protocol would occur within ninety days, but it soon became appar-
ent that it would take considerably longer for the parties to com-
plete discovery and submit appropriate briefing. The hearing
eventually was postponed by stipulation until late September 2006,
and required four full days rather than the two days originally con-
templated. By the time of the hearing, the parties had submitted
thousands of pages of documents, deposition transcripts, expert
declarations, and other materials to be considered along with the
live testimony presented at the hearing.46
On March 30, 2006, at the invitation of the state attorney gen-
eral's office, I visited San Quentin and, along with counsel, con-
ducted an inspection of the execution chamber and the adjacent
area. We took numerous measurements and photographs and also
41. Morales, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-48.
42. Id. at 1046.
43. Morales v. Hickman, No. 5-6-219-JF-RS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2006) (final order
re defs.' compliance with conditions).
44. See, e.g., Complaint for Equitable and Injunctive Relief at 6-10, Morales v.
Tilton, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 5-6-cv-219-JF-RS).
45. See infra Part II.
46. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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had an on-the-record interview with the prison employee who then
served as the head of the execution team.47 In September, I heard
hours of expert and percipient-witness testimony about every as-
pect of the lethal-injection protocol, from the selection and training
of the execution team to the pharmacology and pharmacokinetics
of the chemicals involved.48 On December 15, the same day that
Governor Jeb Bush suspended executions in Florida following evi-
dent problems in the execution of Angel Diaz,49 I issued a Memo-
randum of Intended Decision indicating that unless California
made substantial revisions to its protocol, I would declare it uncon-
stitutional.50 Among other things, I suggested that the state con-
sider eliminating the use of pain-inducing drugs and develop a
protocol that uses only sedatives. 51
When I recall my dismissive reaction to the lethal-injection claim
in Cooper in light of everything that has happened since, I am re-
minded of how imperfect an adjudicative process can be. The con-
stitutional issue raised by lethal-injection cases is not simply
explained or easily understood. Compared to earlier methods of
execution, lethal injection may appear to be nothing like the "cruel
and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.5 2
Understanding the claim requires knowledge of the physical effects
of each of the chemicals used, the ways in which the execution pro-
cess is subject to human error and the points at which there is a
non-speculative potential for such error, and the medical signifi-
cance of data obtained from the bodies of condemned inmates dur-
ing and after their executions. Despite my desire to be as thorough
and conscientious as possible, the skeptical lens through which I
viewed lethal-injection claims initially made it more difficult for me
to recognize the nature and significance of what I was being asked
to decide.
47. Id. at 977-78.
48. Id. at 978.
49. Adam Liptak & Terry Aguayo, Florida Governor Halts the Death Penalty,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at Al.
50. Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
51. Id. at 983. On May 15, 2007, the state filed a lengthy response addressing each
of the areas in which I had identified deficiencies: selection and screening of mem-
bers of the execution team, training, record-keeping, preparation and administration
of the drugs, and the physical conditions in which executions take place. Because this
document is the subject of pending litigation, I will not comment on it here.
52. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
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II. A CULTURAL DIVIDE
A. An Execution Is Halted
After I issued the conditional order permitting his execution,
Morales appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Morales argued that it was
too late for the state to revise its execution protocol and that de-
spite the specific language in a subsequent order requiring the an-
esthesiologists to use their professional judgment "not merely to
observe the execution but to ensure that Plaintiff is and remains
unconscious"53 before and during the administration of the second
and third drugs, he still faced an unacceptable risk of an Eighth
Amendment violation. The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments
in an opinion issued the day before the execution was to proceed,
emphasizing that the anesthesiologists' role was not merely to ob-
serve the execution, but also to take appropriate action in the
event a problem arose during the execution.54 The Supreme Court
subsequently denied relief. 5
Morales's execution was scheduled for 12:01 a.m. on February
21, 2006. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on the evening of February
20, my death-penalty staff attorney contacted me at home and indi-
cated that the anesthesiologists had concerns about the language of
the Ninth Circuit's opinion and now were unwilling to participate.
The state's attorney requested that I issue a brief order clarifying
the anesthesiologists' responsibilities; Morales's counsel objected
strenuously to my doing anything other than staying the execution;
and the three members of the Ninth Circuit panel that had consid-
ered Morales's appeal were on telephone standby waiting to review
whatever I did. I was told that the anesthesiologists had not under-
stood that they might have to do something more than simply ob-
serve the execution until they read the Ninth Circuit's opinion
earlier that day, a statement that I found extremely perplexing.
The parties had briefed and vigorously argued that very question in
the proceedings before me, and the Ninth Circuit opinion simply
had emphasized what I had said unambiguously in my own order
four days earlier. There is no clear answer in the public record as
to what the anesthesiologists were told by the state officials who
recruited them, and why they apparently understood what they ac-
tually were expected to do so late in the day.
53. Morales v. Hickman, No. 5-6-cv-219-JF-RS, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2006) (final order re defs.' compliance with conditions).
54. Morales v. Hickman, 438 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2006).
55. Morales v. Hickman, 546 U.S. 1163 (2006) (mem.) (den. cert.).
[Vol. XXXV
EYE OF THE STORM
After several hours of telephone conferences, faxes, and e-mails,
the anesthesiologists announced that they would not proceed. The
state attorney general's office indicated that it would seek an order
later that day (now February 21) permitting Morales's execution
using only sodium thiopental, which I had proposed in my condi-
tional order as an alternative to having a qualified professional pre-
sent.56 I scheduled a hearing to consider the state's request,
received what briefing I could, and heard about an hour of oral
argument. I concluded that because there had been virtually no
time to consider any issues or potential problems that might arise
with such an execution (a situation that likely would have been
avoided had the state chosen the single-drug option initially), the
execution could go forward only if the sedative were injected di-
rectly by someone trained and licensed to do so. 57 Late that after-
noon, the state indicated that it would not proceed with the
execution.58
B. Corrections Officials Respond
As noted earlier, I had suggested that whether or not Morales
was executed, the state needed to conduct a "thorough review" of
its lethal-injection protocol to address the substantial questions
Morales had raised.59 On February 28, 2006, there was a meeting
at the Governor's Office attended by the Governor's legal-affairs
secretary, lawyers from the state attorney general's office, one of
the anesthesiologists who had been at San Quentin for the execu-
tion, and a number of representatives of California's Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. According to testimony and
documents offered at the evidentiary hearing in September, the an-
esthesiologist recommended eliminating the second and third drugs
from the execution protocol and conducting future executions us-
ing only a sedative. After that recommendation was rejected, a de-
cision was made to revise the protocol slightly, primarily by
reducing the initial dosage of sodium thiopental and adding a sec-
ond intravenous line that would provide a continuing flow of that
drug while the other two drugs were injected. The meeting lasted
56. Under California law, a death sentence may be executed only on the date
specified in the order of commitment. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1227 (West 2006); CAL.
R. CT. 4.315.
57. No. 5-6-cv-219-JF-RS, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Cal. Feb 21, 2006) (order on defs.'
mot. to proceed with execution under alternative condition to order den. prelim. inj.).
58. The parties dispute whether the state was unable to find a qualified person or
chose not to do so.
59. Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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approximately one and a half hours.6" No further review of the
protocol took place.61
Deposition testimony and undisputed evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing showed that execution team members received
minimal and inconsistent training,62 apparently made no effort to
comply with the manufacturer's directions for mixing the sodium
thiopental used in executions, and in fact were directed by the exe-
cution protocol to proceed in a manner contrary to those direc-
tions.63 In addition, execution team members kept irregular and
sometimes illegible records of condemned inmates' vital signs.64
When asked about the problems with the Williams execution in
December 2005, one of the members of the execution team re-
sponded by saying, "shit does happen, so. ''65 Asked at his deposi-
tion what would qualify as a "successful execution," the warden of
San Quentin responded that it was one in which "the inmate ends
up dead at the end of the process. "66
The Memorandum issued following the evidentiary hearing iden-
tified five areas in which I had concluded that California's imple-
mentation of its lethal-injection protocol was deficient. 67 One ol
these areas was the physical environment in which executions were
carried out, as to which I found as follows:
The execution chamber was not designed for lethal-injection ex-
ecutions; San Quentin officials simply made slight modifications
to the existing gas chamber, such as drilling holes in the cham-
ber wall for intravenous lines and installing a metal hook at the
top of the chamber from which the bags containing the lethal
drugs are suspended. The bags are too high to permit the execu-
tion team to verify whether the equipment is working properly.
The lighting is too dim, and execution team members are too far
away, to permit effective observation of any unusual or unex-
pected movements by the condemned inmate, much less to de-
termine whether the inmate is conscious; this is exacerbated by
the fact that the chamber door is sealed shut during executions
as if lethal gas were being disseminated, rendering it virtually
impossible to hear any sound from the chamber. For some ex-
ecutions, the small anteroom from which the execution team in-
60. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 979.
63. Id. at 980.
64. Id. at 979.
65. Id. at 979 n.8.
66. Id. at 983 n.14.
67. Id. at 979-80.
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jects the lethal drugs has been so crowded with prison officials
and other dignitaries that even simple movement has been
difficult.68
The Memorandum directed the state to respond to my findings,
indicating whether or not it intended to implement changes to the
protocol, within thirty days.69 Three days later, the Governor is-
sued a press release stating that he had directed California's cor-
rections officials to address each of the deficiencies identified in
the Memorandum.70 On January 16, 2007, the state filed its formal
response, indicating that it would submit a full report to the Court
by May 15, 2007.7 1 Nowhere in the Memorandum did I order, nor
have I ever ordered, that the state take any specific remedial
measure.
On March 5, 2007, without notice to the state legislature or ap-
parently even to the Governor's Office, the Department of Correc-
tions and Rehabilitation began construction of a new lethal-
injection chamber at San Quentin. The project became a matter of
general public knowledge only after the cost exceeded the amount
California state agencies may spend without prior legislative ap-
proval. When asked by a legislative oversight committee why the
construction had commenced without its knowledge, a corrections
official responded on behalf of San Quentin's warden that the
Court had ordered that a new chamber be built.72 When it was
pointed out that the Memorandum contained no such requirement,
the warden (a named party in Morales) admitted that he had not
read the Memorandum.73 The Governor subsequently suspended
construction of the new chamber pending legislative authorization,
which ultimately was given in August 2007.74
68. Id. at 980.
69. Id. at 984.
70. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Cal., Governor Schwarzenegger Or-
ders Administration to Amend Implementation of Lethal Injection Protocol (Dec. 18,
2006), http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/4940 [hereinafter Schwarzenegger Press
Release].
71. Response by Governor's Office to Court's Mem. Intended Decision & Defs.'
Response to Mem. Intended Decision, Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (No. 5-6-cv-219-
JF-RS).
72. Findings of S. Public Safety Comm. Informational Hearing on San Quentin
Death Chamber, 2007-08 Sess. (Cal. 2007).
73. Id.
74. Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., CDCR Resumes Construction of





I have asked myself many questions about the actions of Califor-
nia's Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation over the past
two years. How could those supervising Morales's execution at
San Quentin have misunderstood a specific order regarding the
role of the anesthesiologists? How could departmental officials
have considered a brief meeting in the Governor's Office to be a
"thorough review" of the execution protocol? How could they not
train the execution team to follow the simple mixing instructions
for sodium thiopental, which because it induces unconsciousness is
the critical drug in the context of legal challenges to lethal injec-
tion? How could they have begun construction of a new execution
chamber on the basis of non-existent language in a court order they
had never read? 75
It would be inappropriate for me to speculate about the subjec-
tive motives of individuals. Indeed, the more I have thought about
them, the more I think that my questions arise not from the actions
of individual persons but from the more fundamental fact that the
legal system and the corrections bureaucracy are different cultures
in which the same words and events often have different implica-
tions and consequences. As with any cultural differences, effective
communication requires an understanding not only of content but
also of context.
While in the judicial context, every word concerning the role of
the anesthesiologists was the subject of briefing and argument by
counsel and hopefully careful drafting on my part, in the context of
prison officials preparing for an execution, the overriding points
were that the anesthesiologists would be there in the first place and
that the purpose of their presence would be to monitor the execu-
tion to ensure that everything proceeded as planned. The ques-
tions of role and responsibility, along with all of the complex
medical and legal issues attendant to those questions, likely were
secondary if they were considered at all.
Similarly, while I never ordered state officials to build a new exe-
cution chamber, I did make a number of specific findings about the
inadequacies of the existing facility, 76 and the Governor indicated
in his press conference that the state intended to address each of
75. Because it is likely to be the subject of future proceedings, I will not discuss
the state's official response, filed May 15, 2007, to the Memorandum of Intended
Decision.
76. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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the deficiencies I had identified. 77 In the bureaucratic context, per-
haps these facts were understood as an implicit direction to address
the Court's concerns by the construction of a new chamber.
The relevant lesson for judges involved in cases such as Morales
is that context is important. While our obligation to be meticulous
in our legal analysis and legally coherent in our orders and deci-
sions remains the same, we also have to consider the dynamics of
the institution in which our orders and decisions will be imple-
mented. Institutions have their own customs, perspectives, and
ways of initiating or resisting change. Especially when we are deal-
ing with processes that involve a large number of people and mov-
ing parts-such as execution by lethal injection-we have to be
mindful of such institutional differences if we expect our orders to
have their intended effect.
I. THE MEDIA
A. Coverage of the Morales Case
Because the death penalty has been such a powerful political is-
sue in California, and perhaps also because actual executions have
been so rare,78 every imminent execution has received extensive
media coverage. Even in Cooper and Beardslee, the brief hearings
I conducted drew numerous reporters. In Cooper, the great major-
ity of media interest focused on Cooper's claims of innocence-the
lethal-injection challenge typically was mentioned only in passing if
at all-and perhaps because Beardslee never attracted the high-
profile supporters many condemned inmates have had, the public-
ity surrounding his execution was surprisingly muted.
The Williams execution on December 13, 2005, was another mat-
ter. Williams had international notoriety-he even had been nomi-
nated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his post-conviction efforts to
discourage inner-city youth from joining street gangs-and his exe-
cution was particularly controversial. There were demonstrations
featuring national political figures and Hollywood celebrities in the
days leading up to the execution. Thus, even though Williams did
not file a lethal-injection challenge, the fact that there were appar-
ent difficulties in executing him was well-publicized.79 Morales was
filed while public debate about the Williams case was still ongoing
77. See Schwarzenegger Press Release, supra note 70.
78. See Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 975 n.3.
79. The state attorney general's office later acknowledged these difficulties. See,




and while the curious circumstances surrounding the subsequent
execution of Clarence Allen, who required a second injection of
potassium chloride to stop his heart, still were recent news. In ad-
dition, as noted earlier, the facts of Morales's crime had particular
resonance. As a result, when it became apparent in early February
2006 that I was considering enjoining Morales's execution because
of questions arising from an examination of the records from Cali-
fornia's eleven previous executions by lethal injection-including
the executions of Williams and Allen-media interest grew
significantly.
Not surprisingly, many news articles framed the issue in the case
as whether lethal injection in the abstract is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 80 Others characterized the case as concerning whether it
is constitutional for a condemned inmate to suffer any pain at all,
including the pain anyone would suffer upon insertion of a nee-
dle.81 Few focused on the actual question presented by the case,
which was whether California's execution protocol, as imple-
mented, in fact was functioning as intended. None, so far as I
know, mentioned the state's admission in its pleadings that in the
absence of anesthesia, the level of pain caused by potassium chlo-
ride would violate Eighth Amendment standards.
As discussed earlier, I had given the state the option of executing
Morales using only sedatives or having qualified persons present at
the execution to insure that Morales remained unconscious during
the administration of the second and third drugs in the execution
protocol.82 After the state chose the latter option, the news media
in general reported that I had ordered the state to have doctors
assist in the execution.83 This in turn led to a spate of articles about
the ethical implications of such an order.84 The fact that the state
had elected to have the anesthesiologists participate rather than
having been ordered to do so, and that neither party had briefed or
80. See, e.g., David Kravets, Lethal Injection of Murderer-Rapist Could be
Blocked, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 10, 2006, at A4 ("A federal judge said yester-
day that he might block a murderer and rapist's Feb. [sic] 21 execution to provide
enough time to determine whether lethal injection is cruel and unusual
punishment.").
81. See, e.g., Debra J. Saunders, Inartful Execution, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 23, 2006, at
B9; cf. Kelsy Chauvin, Experts Discuss Ethics of Lethal Injections, COLUM. UNIV. RE-
CORD, Feb. 14, 2008, at 6.
82. Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
83. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Wal-Mart and the Death Penalty, WASH. PosT, Feb.
26, 2006, at B3.
84. See, e.g., Atul Gawande, When Law and Ethics Collide-Why Physicians Par-
ticipate in Executions, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1221 (2006).
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argued potential issues of medical ethics, did not appear in media
reports. When the anesthesiologists declined to proceed with the
execution, most of the relevant news articles cited the doctors' ethi-
cal concerns but did not explain why they had agreed to participate
initially and what had changed in the interim to cause them to
withdraw.85
After a brief firestorm surrounding the postponement of the exe-
cution, subsequent media coverage of Morales became more sub-
stantive.86 Pursuant to a pooling arrangement, two reporters were
part of the group that visited San Quentin in March 2006.87 Sev-
eral lengthy pieces in the print media discussed the history of lethal
injection and the factual and legal issues underlying lethal-injection
challenges around the country.88 During and following the Sep-
tember evidentiary hearing, most media coverage described the is-
sues in the case as involving California's actual implementation of
its particular protocol rather than the constitutionality of lethal in-
jection itself.89 The public received relatively detailed information
about the effects of the drugs involved and the evidence offered by
both sides with respect to lethal-injection claims.90
This trend continued following the issuance of the Memorandum
of Intended Decision that December. While a few articles stated
that I had declared lethal injection itself (or any pain suffered by a
condemned inmate) to be cruel and unusual,9' the great majority
reported my findings with respect to specific deficiencies in Califor-
nia's implementation of its execution protocol.92 Subsequent me-
dia reports focused on the potential impact that Morales and
Governor Bush's almost simultaneous order imposing a morato-
85. See, e.g., California Execution Delayed After Doctors Refuse to Witness,
KHALEEJ TIMES (Dubai), Feb. 21, 2006, available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/Dis-
playArticle.asp?xfile=data/theworld/2006/February/theworldFebruary578.xml&sec-
tion=theworld.
86. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Lethal-Injection Method on Trial Across the U.S., S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 23, 2006, at Al.
87. Howard Mintz, Judge Gets Execution Site Tour: San Quentin Visit Is Prelude to
May Death Penalty Hearing, SAN JOSE MERC. NEWS, Mar. 31, 2006, at Al.
88. See, e.g., Cheryl Clark, Lethal-Injection Controversy Shifts Focus to Medical
Details, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 25, 2006, at Al.
89. See, e.g., Maura Dolan & Henry Weinstein, The Chaos Behind California Ex-
ecutions: Trial Testimony Paints Lethal Injection Methods as Haphazard, with Little
Medical Oversight, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at Al.
90. See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
91. See, e.g., Al Knight, In California, the Death Penalty Takes Yet Another Hit,
DENV. POST, Dec. 22, 2006, at B7.
92. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Terry Aguayo, Florida Governor Halts the Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at Al.
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rium on executions in Florida would have on the future of lethal
injection nationally.93 Again, most of these reports explained the
effects of the drugs and the specific nature of the claims.94
B. Life in the Fishbowl
While the same ethical rule that requires judges to "avoid public
comment on the merits of a pending or impending action" also ex-
pressly permits judges to make public statements explaining court
procedures, 95 it clearly does not permit them to argue with the me-
dia about the meaning, significance, or wisdom of a ruling. While
judges must expect criticism, judges handling controversial cases
often find themselves in situations where a ruling has been mis-
characterized in the press-as a result of which they are criti-
cized-yet they are ethically constrained from correcting the
record, at least at the time.
Although I have handled a significant number of high-profile
cases, none has involved media interest anything like that in
Morales. While the case has been pending, my chambers has re-
ceived requests for interviews from journalists from all over the
world. Producers of radio and television talk shows, many of
whom I assume are unfamiliar with the ethical restrictions on pub-
lic comment by judges, have called to ask if I would participate in
live debates about lethal injection and the death penalty. Report-
ers profiling me as part of their coverage of the case repeatedly
have asked for my views on capital punishment, the propriety of
physician participation in executions, and other issues about which
it clearly would be inappropriate for me to comment.
Like judges, reporters often face a steep learning curve when
dealing with issues that are simultaneously controversial and com-
plex. Having presided over both Cooper and Beardslee and having
spent many hours immersing myself in execution logs and forensic
medical testimony before even considering whether to enjoin or
impose conditions on Morales's execution, I cringed when I read
news accounts suggesting that I was considering whether lethal in-
jection is unconstitutional because a condemned inmate might suf-
fer "some" pain. I had gone to great lengths in my factual findings
to distinguish the evidence of how sodium thiopental works when it
93. See, e.g., id.
94. See, e.g., id.
95. Code of Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3(A)(6) (2000), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html#3.
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is properly delivered 96 from the circumstantial evidence in the exe-
cution logs that it may not have been properly delivered in a num-
ber of cases,97 and had given the state alternative ways of
proceeding with Morales's execution. Thus, I was discouraged to
read stories stating that I had ordered the state to hire doctors, and
that I had done so because I was concerned about the infinitesimal
possibility that Morales might not be unconscious even after re-
ceiving an effective administration of five grams of sodium
thiopental.
However, after the emotions around the delayed execution
abated and as the case evolved, I noticed a subtle but steady shift
in the media's coverage. Given time to learn about the issues, the
majority of reporters began to describe Morales and other cases as
fact-specific challenges to a particular method of execution as it
was being carried out in practice.98 I realized that like many
judges, many members of the news media initially see stories
through the lens of their own previous experience, and that it is
only over time that unconscious distortions and blind spots in that
lens give way to a more accurate understanding of the actual situa-
tion. Although it was frustrating not to be able to answer questions
about my decision publicly, it was comforting to discover that, over
time, the media gained a broader perspective, and their portrayal
of the case and of the issues involved became more complete. This
also reminded me that it is in our interest as judges to write deci-
sions in which our reasoning is as transparent as possible. While
our focus properly is on the law, the facts, and the claims of the
parties, I see significant value in acknowledging and addressing ex-
pressly the extent to which a particular decision affects a matter of
public interest.99
IV. THE PUBLIC DEBATE
Like abortion, illegal immigration, and other issues that have di-
vided our society in recent years, capital punishment stirs powerful
passions. While scholars marshal data about deterrence and cost
96. Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043-44 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
97. Id. at 1044-46.
98. See, e.g., Dolan & Weinstein, supra note 89.
99. Given the propensity of much of the electronic media to describe issues in
"sound bites," this often is not an easy task. At the same time, I believe that public
confidence in the judiciary depends at least to some extent on our ability to explain
clearly in non-technical language the reasoning underlying our decisions, as well as
the ways in which legal decision-making necessarily differs from the political
processes with which the public generally is more familiar.
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effectiveness, and religious and political leaders argue about retrib-
utive justice and the sanctity of life, I suspect that most people's
views about the death penalty ultimately are visceral, a product of
how they see and experience the world. Every horrific crime
evokes an emotional response, and every execution brings people
with deeply felt yet profoundly different views of justice into direct
conflict with each other. The legal issues in a particular case often
are of little significance in the public debate.
Although I presided over portions of several capital cases as a
state-court judge, Cooper was my first case that directly involved a
pending execution, and it gave me a brief glimpse of what was to
come in terms of the public's reaction. While most of the public
attention focused on Cooper's claim of innocence and the Ninth
Circuit's consideration of his successive habeas petition, my hear-
ing on Cooper's separate lethal-injection challenge drew a full
courtroom. Shortly after I denied Cooper's request for a tempo-
rary restraining order,100 but before the Ninth Circuit granted
Cooper's separate application to file a successive habeas petition
and stayed the execution, 10 1 I received a long, articulate letter from
a death-penalty opponent who had been present at the hearing ex-
coriating me for not doing everything in my power to prevent the
execution of an innocent man. There was not a word about
Cooper's claims concerning lethal injection or any apparent recog-
nition that the question of Cooper's innocence was not before me.
When Beardslee appeared on my docket a year later, I expected
more controversy, but for reasons that are not entirely clear to
me-perhaps because Beardslee never claimed to be innocent and
because the crimes of which he was convicted, though certainly hei-
nous enough to warrant the death penalty under California law, did
not evoke a particularly strong response among death-penalty sup-
porters-most of the heat was generated by Beardslee's defense
team and the established advocacy groups that weigh in on every
execution. At the same time, I knew that the lull would be
temporary.
The Williams execution added claims of innocence, racism, and
post-offense rehabilitation-juxtaposed with Williams's past as the
founder of the Crips and the brutality of the multiple murders of
which he was convicted-to the ongoing argument about the death
penalty itself. The Allen execution raised issues arising from Al-
100. Cooper v. Rimmer, No. 5-4-cv-436-JF, 2004 WL 231325 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2004).
101. Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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len's age and poor health. And, as discussed earlier, although
neither Williams nor Allen chose to assert a challenge to Califor-
nia's lethal-injection protocol, the unexpected difficulties that ac-
companied each of these executions helped to lay the groundwork
for Morales's lethal-injection claim only a few weeks later.
Morales's crimes were horrific, °2 and according to the record, he
showed very little remorse. The victim's family, friends, and com-
munity were devastated by the murder and had been waiting for
almost twenty-five years while Morales's appeals and habeas peti-
tions worked their way through the legal system. Once the federal
habeas process had been exhausted, Morales's lethal-injection
challenge was his last meaningful hope of avoiding execution.
Almost from the inception of the proceedings, I was aware of an
unusual amount of public interest. When I granted expedited dis-
covery so that Morales could obtain execution records from San
Quentin prior to the hearing on his motion for a preliminary in-
junction, I received letters from people in the victim's community
detailing Morales's crimes and urging me to reject his claims. I
received more letters when I took the motion for preliminary in-
junction under submission and indicated that I would give serious
consideration to the issues and evidence that had been presented.
Most of the letters were reasonably courteous, but the basic mes-
sage was that Morales should die and that nothing should be al-
lowed to stand in the way. To the extent that any of the letters
mentioned the issues concerning lethal injection at all, they said
essentially that the manner of Morales's death should be no better
than that of his victim.
When I issued a conditional order permitting the state to go for-
ward with the execution, the atmosphere changed entirely. Instead
of receiving pleas to permit the execution and dire warnings about
what would happen if I didn't, I was told that involving doctors in
executions was reminiscent of the practices of Nazi Germany10 3
and that it was my moral duty to outlaw the death penalty. While a
few people still suggested that Morales was getting much better
treatment than he deserved, the outcry from execution supporters
for the most part abated. When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the con-
ditional order on February 19, 2006, there was a day of relative
quiet from both sides. Then, following the strange events of Febru-
ary 20 and 21, 2006-the eleventh-hour withdrawal of the anesthe-
102. See generally Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2004).
103. This accusation had a particular irony in my case as numerous members of my
extended family died in the Holocaust.
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siologists and the state's brief effort to proceed with the execution
using a single drug-all hell broke loose.
I did not actually count them, but I would estimate that within
the first several days following the postponement of the execution,
I received nearly 100 e-mails and perhaps two dozen letters, nearly
all of them extremely critical. The basic theme was the same as
that of the letters I had received earlier, which was that Morales
had committed horrible crimes and deserved to die. In contrast to
that of the earlier communications, the tone of most of these e-
mails and letters was angry and bitterly personal. I was accused of
caring more about a murderer than about his victim, of being ut-
terly lacking in intelligence or common sense, of being more con-
cerned about legal technicalities than about justice, and so on. As
had been the case before, there was little discussion of lethal injec-
tion itself, other than an occasional comment that the suffering of
the victim was far greater than any pain Morales might suffer dur-
ing his execution. Eventually, the hostile communications slowed
to a trickle and then stopped.
I have noticed a similar pattern in other lethal-injection cases
around the country. As an execution date approaches, there is in-
tense focus on the facts of the crime, the character of the defen-
dant, and the broader arguments about capital punishment.
Concerns about lethal injection itself, while mentioned, clearly are
secondary to the fundamental question of whether death is the ap-
propriate penalty for the crime in question. In the numerous re-
cent cases in which stays have been granted as a result of the
Supreme Court's order granting certiorari in Baze v. Rees,1°4 much
of the public comment has tracked almost word-for-word the
messages I received when the Morales execution was postponed.
Although there was significant media coverage of our visit to
San Quentin in March 2006 and the subsequent evidentiary hear-
ing, and there has been a great deal of national and international
media attention in light of Baze, recent public discussion of
Morales has been relatively sparse. As the information available to
the public through the media has focused more on the details of
the legal issues surrounding lethal injection and less on a specific
crime, victim, and execution, emotions apparently have cooled, at
least for now. When I issued my Memorandum in December 2006,
knowing that its practical effect was that there would be no execu-
tions in California for some time, I fully expected another wave of
104. 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 34, amended by 128 S. Ct.
372 (2007).
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angry e-mails and letters, yet there were fewer than half a dozen.
In fact, most of the negative comments I received came from
death-penalty opponents who objected to my having given the
state an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in its execution proto-
col and having suggested ways that it might do so. In terms of the
issues it actually presents, lethal-injection litigation is rather dry.
The factual basis of the claims cannot be explained in a sound bite.
The Eighth Amendment legal standard is uncertain and is the pri-
mary question before the Supreme Court in Baze,10 5 and resolution
of factual disputes typically requires a laborious review of expert
testimony and prison records. For obvious legal reasons, the plain-
tiffs cannot ask for what they ultimately seek: abolition of capital
punishment or a permanent stay of execution. For most ardent
supporters of the death penalty, the method of execution is a far
less important concern than seeing that an execution in fact is car-
ried out. For those who fervently oppose the death penalty, the
question of how much pain a condemned inmate suffers while be-
ing put to death is largely beside the point.
Yet every lethal-injection case, because it has the potential to
delay an execution, exposes our society's deeper disagreements
about crime and punishment. Regardless of how often judges state
that the legal merits of a lethal-injection challenge must be evalu-
ated independently of those disagreements, °6 public opinion in
general does not reflect these lawyerly distinctions. The challenge
for judges in such an environment is to keep our balance, to be
aware of the differences between the way we approach lethal-injec-
tion cases and the way they are perceived by the non-lawyer public
while at the same time remaining faithful to the law and the legal
process.
V. PERSONAL IMPACT
Becoming a federal judge is as much about timing as it is about
talent. Of course it helps if the legal community thinks well of
105. In Baze, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the constitutional threshold
for a lethal-injection challenge is a "substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary inflic-
tion of pain." 217 S.W.3d at 209. In Cooper, the Ninth Circuit described the applica-
ble standard as "an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering." Cooper v.
Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004). A district court in Indiana adopted the
"deliberate indifference" standard used in prison-conditions cases. Timberlake v.
Buss, No. 1-6-cv-1859-RLY-WTL, 2007 WL 1280664, at *8 (S.D. Ind. May 1, 2007)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). Among other things, the petitioners
in Baze have asked the United States Supreme Court to clarify the standard.
106. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 972-74 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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one's intellect and judicial temperament, but there are many fine
lawyers who never reach the federal bench because there is not a
vacancy when their appointment is politically feasible, or there are
other, better-qualified or better-connected candidates when a va-
cancy does occur. I always have felt both deeply honored and ex-
tremely fortunate to be a United States District Judge. As each
year has passed, I also have realized ever more fully the impor-
tance of my responsibilities and of giving the very best of myself to
my job.
Although I am not fond of philosophical labels, I am a firm be-
liever in legal process and the common law. One of my historical
role models is Learned Hand, who at different points in his cele-
brated judicial career frustrated both liberals and conservatives by
his insistence on deciding controversial cases on the basis of legal
principles rather than a social agenda. I try to avoid deciding issues
unnecessary to the resolution of a case, and I do my best to respect
the separation of powers and defer to the prerogatives of the other
branches of government. As an experienced mediator, I also tend
to think about the interests underlying the legal positions taken by
parties.
In large part because I have been a judge for most of my adult
life, I never have taken a public position with respect to the death
penalty. When asked during my confirmation process whether I
had any opinions or beliefs that would prevent me from following
the law with respect to capital punishment, I truthfully answered
no. I denied stays of execution to Kevin Cooper and Donald
Beardslee in connection with their lethal-injection challenges, °7
and shortly thereafter Beardslee was executed. Cooper would
have been executed but for a stay issued in his separate habeas
action. Until the state indicated that it would not proceed with his
execution on the afternoon of February 21, 2006, I assumed that
Michael Morales would be executed as well.
Judges typically are at least somewhat removed from the actual
consequences of their decisions. The judge who issues an eviction
order in a landlord-tenant dispute is not present when the tenants
are evicted and doesn't endure the consequences of the eviction.
The judge who decides a contested child-custody case does not see
what happens when a child's life is disrupted and rearranged. And
normally, a judge who denies a stay of execution in a capital case is
107. See supra Part L.A-B.
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not called upon to deal with the practical details of the execution
or its emotional impact on the various people involved.
All of that changed for me late in the evening of February 20,
2006. For much of that night and the next day, I was engaged in
the most intense discussions and hearings imaginable about the
precise conditions under which Michael Morales was to be put to
death. Other than my being a member of the execution team, it is
hard to imagine how there could have been less distance between
my judicial actions and their intended consequences.
Nor were the consequences limited to whether Morales lived or
died. From the outset of the case, I had thought about the victim's
family and loved ones and their long wait for finality. Regardless
of one's opinion about the death penalty, a legal system that re-
quires a family that has lost a child to endure twenty-five years of
uncertainty as to her murderer's fate is seriously dysfunctional.
Members of the family had come to San Quentin to witness the
execution, and as a result of the circumstances that caused the exe-
cution to be delayed and ultimately postponed, they were going
home after many grueling hours with nothing resolved other than
the certainty of more delay. I knew that they would be deeply up-
set and that they would blame me-at least in part, if not en-
tirely-for what had happened, and that I could not speak to them
directly to tell them how badly I felt for them.
Although I had received occasional nasty letters and e-mails at
various times in my judicial career, nothing prepared me for the
communications I received in the days after the Morales execution
was postponed. At some level, I realized that 100 or so angry mis-
sives from members of the public in a state with a population of
thirty-four million hardly constituted a flood, and I received
thoughtful support from colleagues, friends, and family. But hav-
ing tried so hard to do the right thing, to have taken my best shot at
understanding the record, applying the law, and fashioning a rem-
edy, the venom expressed by many of those who wrote was difficult
to absorb.
One of the purposes of the visit to San Quentin was to inspect
the execution chamber and its immediate environs and take mea-
surements and photographs. As part of that process, I entered the
chamber itself and observed the various items of hardware used in
executions. The chamber used for executions by lethal injection,
with a few minor modifications, was the same one that had been
used for executions by lethal gas, and it was impossible to be in
that space without thinking about what had taken place there in
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the past. The evidentiary hearing in September 2006 was a further
journey into the technical minutiae of lethal-injection executions,
with experts explaining the pharmacokinetics of different drugs
and arguing about the significance or insignificance of data in the
logs of past executions.
I knew that I was facing the greatest professional challenge, and
one of the greatest personal challenges, of my life. As a matter of
both philosophy and temperament, I typically try to resolve
problems in a way that acknowledges the interests of all concerned.
Despite the fact that I have had a very public career, a major part
of which has been making decisions with which one or more parties
disagree, I have tended to be very cautious in handling controver-
sial cases. But it was evident from my first days with the Morales
case that no matter what I did, I would make a lot of people very
angry. When the plans for the execution began to unravel on the
evening of February 20, I went to bed knowing that the following
days would be among the most stressful I ever would have to
endure.
During those days, and since, I have drawn strength from three
distinct sources. Because I am not an outwardly religious person,
the first is difficult for me to describe, but in the end the best word
for it is faith. I have faith that things happen for a reason, and that
if one does one's best to act with integrity, things usually will work
out in the end. I often have looked back at various points in the
proceedings and wondered what I could or should have done dif-
ferently, and I have asked myself repeatedly whether my analysis
of certain legal or factual issues was correct. I know that there are
thoughtful people of good will who disagree with me, and that
there are things I could have done better, but I also know that I did
the best job I was able to do at the time. For someone who has
struggled with perfectionist tendencies all my life, this is an impor-
tant realization, one that is both humbling and empowering.
The second source of strength is the people around me. I am
blessed with a loving family, a circle of long-time and caring
friends, and many kind colleagues both within my own court and in
the legal community generally. I have no idea whether they would
have made the same calls I did or handled the case in the same
way, but their support for me as a person has made a world of
difference.
Finally, and most relevant for purposes of this Article, I have
derived enormous strength from the rule of law and the legal pro-
cess itself. Even in a case that touches upon one of our society's
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most divisive issues and has generated so much emotion, the pro-
cess has moved the debate forward. Numerous states, including
California, have decided to review their procedures for carrying
out executions. As I write these concluding words, I am on my way
back to California after watching, as a member of the public, the
Supreme Court oral argument in Baze.10 8 Of course, I cannot com-
ment publicly on the substance of the argument or its likely out-
come. But regardless of whether the Court uses Baze to announce
a national standard for Eighth Amendment review of execution
protocols, or considers the mechanics of the current three-drug
combination, or simply decides the case on its own particular facts
and leaves one or both of these issues for another day, the argu-
ment was a remarkable event.
For the first time in more than a century, the Court engaged in a
focused examination of the way our society carries out execu-
tions.10 9 Together with ongoing reviews of other aspects of capital
punishment, including among other things, the need to provide de-
fendants with adequate counsel and the related problem of reduc-
ing the intolerable delays in post-conviction review of capital cases,
the lethal-injection controversy has contributed to a renewed na-
tional dialogue about the death penalty itself. Whatever the ulti-
mate outcome, and irrespective of one's own views, I think that this
debate is healthy for our society. For all the ways in which Morales
v. Tilton has affected and will continue to affect my life, I am glad
to have played a small role in furthering that dialogue.
108. Lead counsel for Morales and for the state also attended the argument.
109. The only Supreme Court case to address directly the constitutionality of a
method of execution was In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding constitution-
ality of execution by firing squad).
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